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Abstract. We propose a novel approach for supporting privacy management that 
leverages community experience and expertise via the process of social navigation. 
Social navigation simplifies the often complex task of managing privacy settings, and 
systems that employ social navigation can advantageously complement user privacy 
management processes. We implemented our approach to privacy management in the 
Acumen system; Acumen uses social navigation to enable individuals to manage their 
Internet cookies both manually and automatically based on the behavior of others in the 
community. We present the Acumen system in detail and discuss data obtained from a 
six-week, preliminary deployment of Acumen. Lastly, we discuss challenges that systems 
implementing our approach must address if they are to be successful. 
Introduction 
Privacy has come to the forefront of societal concerns about technology in recent 
years (Ackerman et al., 1999, EPIC, 2000, Harris, 2003, Turow, 2003). The rise 
of the Internet and ubiquitous computing technologies has made it possible to 
easily collect, store, organize, and share personal information. Such technologies 
offer many benefits; however, there is significant concern that applications and 
entities using these technologies (e.g. companies, governments) are marginalizing 
people’s desire for personal privacy. Much can be gained by addressing people’s 
privacy concerns. These technologies and applications are more likely to be fully 
accepted by and integrated into society if privacy is addressed; in addition, 
scholars argue that privacy is beneficial to both individuals and society (Westin, 
1967, Lessig, 1999). 
For the purposes of this paper, we define ‘privacy’ to be an individual’s ability 
to control when and how he shares his personal information with other people and 
third parties; when an individual manages his privacy, then, he manages when and 
how he shares his personal information. 
The HCI community has substantially advanced its understanding of privacy 
management over the past decade. We now understand that privacy management 
cannot be addressed solely or even largely by a static set of preferences that 
determine how a user’s information can be shared. Rather, privacy management is 
a fluid, organic process in which users are constantly refining their choices based 
on any number of contextual facets (Bellotti, 1996, Bellotti and Sellen, 1993, 
Palen and Dourish, 2003). This is true both for privacy management among peers 
and also for privacy management between individuals and “third parties,” such as 
corporations and government agencies. 
Supporting privacy management, then, is a challenging task for a 
computational system. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for supporting 
privacy management that leverages community experience and expertise via 
social navigation. Social navigation is the process of using other people’s 
behavior to inform one’s own behavior (Dieberger et al., 2000); technologies that 
employ social navigation leverage users’ data in aggregate as a form of advice to 
help individuals make decisions. Social navigation technology has proven to be 
successful in many domains (Hill et al., 1992, Resnick et al., 1994, Svensson et 
al., 2001, Wexelblat and Maes, 1999). 
Our approach employs social navigation to support individual privacy 
management decisions and enable novel privacy management techniques. Social 
navigation is a promising approach to privacy management for several reasons. 
Social navigation simplifies the often complex task of managing privacy settings 
by leveraging people’s tacit ability to infer information from others’ decisions and 
use that information as form of advice. Studies have shown that, if advice is 
available when making a decision, users very often use the advice and make a 
better decision as a result of using the advice (Harvey and Fisher, 1997, Yaniv, 
2004). In addition, social navigation systems offer a technological complement to 
user privacy management activities; both evolve as user behavior changes, and 
both are frequently collaborative and situated in other, principal activities. 
We have implemented our approach to privacy management in a system that 
enables users to manage an important facet of their Internet privacy: Internet 
cookies. Websites use cookies most often to identify users, store preferences, and 
record users’ browsing behavior. While users derive benefits from using cookies, 
websites can use cookies to identify and monitor users without their consent. 
Such privacy violations have occurred in the past (EPIC, 2000).  
Internet users are becoming increasingly concerned about their privacy online 
and about cookies in particular (Ackerman et al., 1999, Harris, 2003, Turow, 
2003). Managing cookies on an individual basis is impractical, and existing 
solutions for managing cookies, such as P3P user agents (Cranor, 2002) and web 
browsers’ tools, are insufficient at times. These tools are not well understood by 
users, offer little awareness of ongoing cookie activity, and provide inflexible 
settings that do not adapt to changes in users’ needs and attitudes (Friedman et al., 
2002, Millett et al., 2001). 
The Acumen system employs social navigation to help users manage their 
cookies. Acumen addresses many problems of existing cookie management 
solutions and also provides novel methods for managing cookies. Acumen’s 
interface is an Internet Explorer toolbar (Figure 1) that enables users to manage 
their cookies by leveraging social navigation data. To this end, Acumen collects 
information about how users are managing their cookies and employs this data for 
three purposes. 
First, Acumen uses its data to raise users’ awareness of cookies, especially 
those that others have blocked. This information is conveyed via color-coded 
icons in the toolbar; icons are colored using biased thresholds that accentuate user 
activity. Second, Acumen makes its data available to help individuals make more 
informed decisions about whether to block or allow a website’s cookies. Third, 
Acumen enables users to automate cookie management by using simple rules 
which automatically block cookies that others have blocked. 
To address herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992), a common problem in social 
navigation, Acumen employs data from all users and also from a subset of expert 
Figure 1. Acumen toolbar for a page on The New York Times website. 
users called mavens (Gladwell, 2000). Mavens’ data can help deter individuals 
from blindly following the decisions of others. 
Overview 
We offer three research contributions in this paper. First, we introduce a novel 
approach to privacy management that employs social navigation. Second, we 
demonstrate an application of this approach in Acumen, a system that enables 
users to manage their Internet cookies. Third, we evaluate Acumen using data 
from a six week, preliminary deployment of the system. We evaluate how well 
Acumen helps users manage their cookies and also discuss five challenges that we 
identified during our design and implementation of Acumen. These challenges 
are: (1) raising awareness of cookies; (2) understanding decision support; (3) 
obtaining data coverage; (4) mitigating herd behavior; and (5) addressing a 
privacy paradox. 
Building on Related Work 
In the previous section, we described how privacy management has come to be 
understood as a dynamic process. Our approach for supporting privacy 
management builds both on this work and on work in two other areas: (a) social 
navigation research and (b) research investigating management of Internet privacy 
and Internet cookies. 
Social Navigation 
The adage “a crowd draws a crowd” describes one instance of social navigation. 
When an individual sees a crowd outside an unfamiliar restaurant, she can infer 
that many people enjoy the food at the restaurant and that the restaurant generally 
serves good food. Hence, she is more likely to dine at the restaurant than she 
otherwise would be because the crowd provides information about how much 
other people like the restaurant. The crowd’s behavior, then, is a simple form of 
data or advice that a bystander can use to make a decision. 
In general, social navigation is the activity of using other people’s behavior to 
inform one’s own behavior. Social navigation is quite common in everyday life; it 
has also been demonstrated to be a powerful concept in digital systems (Dieberger 
et al., 2000). Researchers have built systems that enable users to perform social 
navigation in numerous domains; these domains include editing and reading 
documents (Hill et al., 1992), reading newsgroup messages (Resnick et al., 1994), 
exploring an online food and recipes store (Svensson et al., 2001), and browsing 
the Internet (Wexelblat and Maes, 1999). 
We believe that our approach is the first attempt to explore social navigation as 
a privacy management solution. Social navigation is a particularly promising 
approach to privacy management for several reasons. Social navigation is a tacit 
and natural facet of the decision-making process because people are social beings. 
People routinely make inferences based on others’ behavior and use this 
information as a form of advice; this advice simplifies and informs what can 
otherwise be complex decisions (e.g. how fast should I be driving on an 
unfamiliar road?). Finally, there is substantial evidence that people very often use 
advice and make better decisions as a result (Harvey and Fisher, 1997, Yaniv, 
2004). Social navigation, then, can simplify and improve the often complex 
decisions that people must make when managing their privacy.  
Social navigation systems also offer a technological complement to user 
privacy management processes. Users’ privacy settings evolve to reflect changing 
needs; changes in how personal information is collected and used or in 
community norms surrounding use of personal information prompt changes in 
users’ privacy settings (Palen and Dourish, 2003). Social navigation systems 
evolve as well because user’s activities shape the system; thus, the system evolves 
as users’ activities change.  
Privacy management is frequently a collaborative process; conventions 
regarding privacy management develop among communities, and an individual’s 
management decisions are made in the context of these conventions (Bellotti, 
1996). Social navigation systems support a similar process. Community 
conventions are made visible through user data aggregation, and an individual’s 
decisions are made in the context of, and often directly using, this data.  
Finally, privacy management is often performed most effectively when it is 
complementary activity situated in a principal activity rather than a principal 
activity itself (Bellotti and Sellen, 1993); similarly, social navigation systems are 
situated in principal activities and support decision making in them. 
Internet Privacy and Cookies 
Internet users have numerous privacy concerns. One of their main concerns is the 
collection of personal data by third parties; users want the ability to control when, 
how, and what information they share with third parties. Internet cookies (RFC, 
2004) are particularly troublesome in this respect because websites can use 
cookies to collect and store information about users; sites often use cookies to 
monitor users’ browsing activities. In fact, at least thirty-five percent of websites 
use cookies to collect such information (FTC, 2000). Managing cookies on an 
individual or per-request basis is confusing, tedious, and overly invasive for most 
users. Hence, there is a need for tools that enable users to better manage cookies.  
Some online privacy policies describe how a website uses cookies and what 
data they collect using them. However, online privacy policies are often difficult 
to locate and understand (Jensen and Potts, 2004). The Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) specification enables websites to encode a privacy policy in a 
machine-readable format; software agents can then interpret and utilize P3P 
policies (Cranor, 2002).  
Much work has been done in an attempt to help users manage their cookies. 
Both of today’s major browsers, Internet Explorer and Mozilla, provide users 
with the ability to filter out cookies with particular characteristics. Users can 
block cookies without acceptable privacy policies or cookies from particular 
websites. However, there are problems and inadequacies with both browsers’ 
cookie management tools. For example, cookie settings are often nested deep 
inside many menu levels, making them hard to find and modify; also, browsers 
provide little on-going awareness of cookies and do not enable users to adapt their 
settings to changes in their needs. Finally, many users do not understand the 
terminology that is used by browsers (Friedman et al., 2002, Millett et al., 2001). 
Neither browser uses social navigation to support cookie management. 
There have been efforts to develop tools that extend browsers’ cookie 
management capabilities. Cookie Watcher is an awareness tool that displays 
cookie activity in real-time but does not support cookie management (Friedman et 
al., 2002). The Privoxy web proxy blocks cookies from websites known to track 
users’ activities via cookies for targeted advertising purposes (Privoxy, 2004). 
Privoxy provides little awareness to users about cookies; moreover, Privoxy’s list 
of blocked websites is static, and thus it does not support dynamic or flexible 
cookie management. 
Finally, two systems that employ explicit user voting to help users manage 
other facets of Internet privacy are Cloudmark’s SpamNet (Cloudmark, 2004) and 
the Social Contract Core (SCC) (Kaufman et al., 2002). SpamNet utilizes users’ 
votes to identify and filter spam, and the SCC uses votes to help companies 
improve their privacy policy or develop separate policies for different groups. Our 
approach builds on ideas in these systems. While they indirectly support privacy 
management through user voting, our approach directly leverages activity data 
from others in a community to help individuals manage their privacy. 
Acumen 
Acumen (Figure 2) employs a community’s social navigation data to help 
individuals manage their Internet cookies. Individuals manage cookies at the 
website level, allowing or blocking cookies from websites. Acumen allows all 
cookies by default. Acumen’s social navigation data consists of the number of 
individuals who have “visited” a website (i.e. requested a file from the site), the 
number of such individuals who allow the site’s cookies, and the number of 
individuals who block the site’s cookies. 
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Figure 2. Acumen architecture. 
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Acumen enables community members to manage their cookies via indirect 
collaboration through their actions; each individual benefits by leveraging the 
community’s collective knowledge and experiences via social navigation. 
Acumen enables individuals to leverage its social navigation data in three ways. 
During their normal web browsing activities, individuals can maintain awareness 
of the websites using cookies on the webpages that they are visiting and whether 
other users generally allow or block cookies from these sites. When making the 
decision to allow or block a website’s cookies, individuals can view the social 
navigation data for the site in detail and use this information to inform their 
decision.  
Individuals can also employ simple rules that leverage social navigation data to 
automatically block cookies. Individuals can create rules of the form ‘If X% of 
users have blocked cookies from a website, then automatically block the site’s 
cookies.’ Individuals choose a rule’s threshold percentage when they create it. 
The percentage of individuals that block a site’s cookies includes both individuals 
that block cookies explicitly and those that block cookies by rule. Thus, when one 
individual’s rule blocks a site’s cookies, it can cause another individual’s rule 
with a higher threshold to block the site’s cookies as well, and so on. This chain 
of rule applications acts like a social epidemic (Gladwell, 2000), and it can 
propagate the blocking of a site’s cookies quite quickly among individuals. 
Acumen utilizes social navigation data from all individuals and also from a 
select subset of individuals called mavens. Gladwell defines a maven as a domain 
expert, someone who has both a deep understanding of a domain and also an 
intrinsic desire to learn as much as they can about the domain; mavens have been 
identified in many areas (Gladwell, 2000). Internet privacy mavens almost 
certainly exist as well; people that read and contribute to the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) website1 and those that use free cookie management 
software such as Privoxy are likely mavens. We believe that Acumen is the first 
computational system that attempts to utilize the concept of mavens. 
Acumen leverages mavens’ expertise by anonymously identifying and 
providing data from them. To identify mavens, Acumen computes a ‘maven 
rating’ for each individual; an individual’s rating is the sum of the square roots of 
a individual’s actions across all the websites that he visited:  
 
                                            
Each time an individual explicitly blocks or allows a site’s cookies, Acumen 
increments the individual’s action count for that site. 
This function has two interesting features. First, taking the square root of the 
number of actions decreases the influence the each additional action has on a 
individual’s maven rating; for example, the first 4 actions a individual performs 
on a site will increase his rating by 2, but the subsequent 4 actions that he takes on 
the site will increase his rating by only 0.82  This feature reflects the fact that 
people often learn more in early experiences than they do in latter experiences 
(Fridland et al., 2003); thus, inexperienced individuals’ ratings increase more 
quickly with additional actions than do experienced individuals’ ratings. 
The second interesting feature of the function concerns the placement of the 
square root operator. By taking the square root of actions performed for each site 
rather than the square root of actions performed across all sites, the function 
balances breadth and depth of individual actions, though breadth is slightly 
favored. 
Acumen labels the individuals with the top 20% of ratings as mavens. It is not 
clear what percentage of individuals should be labeled as mavens; we are not 
aware of any estimates about how many mavens are present in a typical domain. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that we designed Acumen to support privacy 
management among a small community. Acumen’s data is useful when 
individuals can effectively infer information from the cookie management 
activities of Acumen’s community of users, and it is easiest to make effective 
inferences if Acumen’s users shares norms and practices. Small communities, 
such as extended workgroups and organizations, often do share norms and 
practices; thus, members of these communities are very likely to be able to use 
Acumen’s data effectively (TODO). 






Acumen integrates into the Internet architecture. Four component types comprise 
the Acumen system: (1) web proxies; (2) a central database; (3) Acumen’s user 
interface, an Internet Explorer toolbar; and (4) web services that provide data to 
the toolbar. 
Acumen’s web proxies records information about users’ browsing activities; 
all users’ web traffic goes through a proxy. The proxies also blocks cookies from 
a webpage request and response if a user has explicitly or by rule blocked the 
site’s cookies.  
Acumen’s database acts as a central repository for all data collected and used 
by the system. For each website that a user has visited, the database maintains a 
user-website history; the history contains the user’s cookies for the site, whether 
the user blocks or allows the site’s cookies, and, if cookies are blocked, how so. 
Acumen’s web services act as intermediaries between its database and users’ 
toolbars. When a user navigates to a webpage, the toolbar obtains data about the 
page from a web service. Web services also handle users’ cookie management 
actions (e.g. blocking a cookie, changing a rule) and update the database 
accordingly. 
Acumen collects data about users’ activities; however, Acumen collects the 
minimum data that is necessary for it to be effective. Acumen records (a) the 
websites that a user has visited; (b) the cookies used by those sites; and (c) the 
user’s cookie management activities. Of course, this is potentially sensitive 
information. Acumen attempts to mitigate privacy concerns by ensuring that user 
data is anonymous both at the user interface level and at the system level. 
Acumen’s interface enables users to view only aggregate data; users are never 
able to view a user’s data. Acumen maintains a persistent profile for each user via 
a pseudonym but does not record any additional identifying information. Acumen 
collects data about users’ activities only when they are logged into the system. 
Internet Explorer Toolbar 
Acumen’s toolbar uses a just-in-time approach to provide cookie information. 
The toolbar lists the websites that are using cookies on the page that a user is 
currently visiting. Next to each website using cookies are two icons. The icon to 
the far left of the site name denotes whether the user allows or blocks the site’s 
cookies; a green double arrow indicates that they are allowed, and a red X 
indicates they are blocked. 
The circle icon to the immediate left of the website name denotes social 
navigation data for the site. Recall that Acumen’s social navigation data is the 
number of users who have blocked/ allowed a website’s cookies. The icon itself 
has two regions: an inner region and an outer region. The inner region’s color 
denotes social navigation data for mavens; the outer region denotes data for all 
users (Figure 3). Regions are colored using a stoplight motif. Green indicates that 
a great majority of users (90% or more) allow the site’s cookies, yellow indicates 
that most users (75% to 90%) allow the site’s cookies, and red indicates that only 
some users (less than 75%) allow the site’s cookies.  
The icons serve to alert users to potentially problematic cookies. A user can 
quickly glance at the toolbar and determine whether there are cookies on a page 
that other users have blocked. A user can also glance at the two icons next to a 
website name and determine whether her decision about the site’s cookies 
matches others’ decisions. A user’s decision matches that of others if the icons are 
the same color; if not, the icons have different colors (Figure 3). 
We use non-linear, biased thresholds for the color categories to reflect the 
often sensitive and conservative nature of privacy management. Even if only a 
few users block a site’s cookies, this information is reflected in an icon’s color 
and thus communicated to the user. Also, users rarely change default settings 
(Mackay, 1990); biased thresholds accentuate any deviation in the social 
navigation data from Acumen’s default of allowing cookies. 
Clicking on a website’s name in the toolbar opens the site’s menu (Figure 4). 
The menu’s top section elaborates on the icons next to the site in the toolbar. If 
cookies are blocked, the menu indicates why; a link is provided to block/allow the 
site’s cookies. Social navigation data is provided numerically, and the number of 
users who block the site’s cookies explicitly and by rule are indicated. 
The menu’s middle section provides a link to view the cookies that a site uses 
(Figure 5) and provides links to menus for child and parent sites. There is a social 
navigation icon next to each child and parent site that denotes the data for that 
site. These links enable users to explore Acumen’s data via relationships between 
parent and child sites. For example, users can easily move to a top-level website 
(e.g. atdmt.com) and block all cookies from that site; blocking cookies from a 
Figure 3. User allows  
cookies; mavens do not. 
      Figure 4. Website menu. Figure 5. A website’s cookies. 
Figures 3-5 (ordered clockwise). Screenshots of Acumen’s toolbar interface. 
parent site blocks cookies from all its child sites as well. 
The menu’s lower section provides system information; the number of users, 
number of websites, and number of documents in Acumen’s database are 
displayed. This information is intended to serve as an incentive for users to utilize 
Acumen; users are more likely to use Acumen if they know that there is data in 
the system. 
The toolbar’s user menu enables users to manage their rules for automatically 
managing cookies and indicates whether the user is a maven. 
Deployment and Evaluation 
We deployed Acumen to nine users for six weeks so that we could begin to 
understand how users would employ Acumen. At the end of the six weeks, 
Acumen had over 2650 websites and 31200 web pages in its database; users had 
blocked cookies from 85 websites using Acumen.  
All users in our deployment utilize the Internet heavily and as part of their job.  
Seven users were graduate students; two users were information workers outside 
the technology industry. Only two users managed their cookies before using 
Acumen; both were graduate students. The seven other users were familiar with 
cookies and expressed some concern about them but did not manage them or 
know their browser’s cookie settings. Users employed Acumen on a voluntary 
basis. We asked users to employ Acumen in the context of their normal browsing 
activities; we did not ask them to be more proactive in managing cookies than 
they otherwise would be, though the presence of Acumen’s toolbar likely 
encouraged them to manage cookies more than they would have otherwise. 
While the number of users that participated in this deployment is small, it is 
still constructive to evaluate data obtained from the deployment. Acumen is a 
novel privacy management system, and this deployment provides needed data that 
offers insight into how users did and did not use Acumen’s features. Evaluation 
data from this deployment will also inform future iterations of Acumen and 
stimulate research questions that can be explored in follow up work. 
We obtained data about this deployment from informal interviews with users, 
logging data, and data from Acumen’s database. Overall, the data is promising; 
users employed many of Acumen’s features to manage their cookies and managed 
their cookies more actively than they did before using Acumen. 
We present data from our deployment in the next two sections. In the 
following section, we address an important but challenging question: are there 
cookies that users generally agree are “good” and other cookies that users 
consider to be “bad?” Addressing this question enables us to begin evaluating 
whether Acumen helped users made good decisions. Then, using data from our 
deployment, we discuss challenges that we encountered when designing Acumen. 
Allowing the “Good,” Blocking the “Bad” 
One important evaluation criterion for Acumen is the degree to which its social 
navigation data helps users make high-quality decisions. The question, then, is 
whether Acumen helps users allow desirable (“good”) cookies and block 
undesirable (“bad”) cookies. Before we can evaluate Acumen using this criterion, 
though, a method or model is needed to label cookies as good or bad; to the best 
of our knowledge, there is no such model. We first introduce our model for 
labeling cookies and then apply it to evaluate user decisions in Acumen. 
A Model for Labelling Cookies 
While there are individual differences in privacy preferences (Ackerman et al., 
1999), there is likely to be some agreement among people about which cookies 
are good and which are bad. The primary obstacle that prevents people from 
labeling cookies is that they have difficultly operationalizing their privacy 
preferences. In other words, it is difficult for people to understand how cookies 
and features of cookies impact their privacy, and thus it is difficult for them to 
manage their cookies. For example, people may not understand how persistent 
identification changes when a website uses a long-lived cookie instead of a 
session cookie or how “third-party” cookies impact their privacy differently than 
“first-party” cookies.  
Compact P3P policies (Cranor, 2002), which are attached to cookies when they 
are sent to people, have begun to address these difficulties; however, many 
technological issues still impede people’s ability to determine how cookies impact 
their privacy. Operationalizing privacy preferences in cookie management is also 
difficult because feedback is often lacking during management; many websites do 
not enable people to see how allowing or blocking cookies affects the information 
that websites collect about them. 
We have taken these difficulties into account in our model. We use a 
simplified objective model, based on one observable and meaningful cookie 
attribute, to label cookies as good or bad. This attribute is the website from which 
a cookie originated; a cookie’s originating website is available in all cookie 
management interfaces, including Acumen. By using this attribute, we ensure that 
people can operationalize their privacy preferences within our model and make an 
educated decision about how to label a cookie. 
Our model fuses results from multiple Internet privacy studies (Ackerman et 
al., 1999, FTC, 2000, Harris, 2003, Turow, 2003). A cookie’s host website is 
remarkably useful information for people. Knowing the host website enables an 
individual to (a) associate some degree of trust/mistrust in the cookie and (b) infer 
a rudimentary benefit/cost ratio for using the website’s cookies. 
Interpreting these two facets as continuously-valued attributes of cookies 
yields a two-dimensional, four-quadrant model for labeling cookies (Figure 6). 
The dimensions are (1) the degree of trust in a website/cookie and (2) the 
benefit/cost ratio of using a website/cookie.  
The model’s dimensions aggregate multiple factors that influence people’s 
privacy preferences. The dimension ‘trust in a website’ includes a site’s 
reputation, business practices, privacy policies, and data sharing (and selling) 
policies. The dimension ‘benefit/cost ratio’ is simpler; people compare the 
benefits of using a site to its privacy costs. Privacy costs include data necessarily 
collected by the site so that it can provide benefits, data that is unnecessary but 
still collected by the site, and uses of collected data (e.g. unwanted email). While 
people are rarely aware of all data that a website has about them, they often have 
some knowledge of the data that they have given to or has been collected by a 
site. 
This model is not inclusive or complete, but it is a first attempt to address how 
people make cookie management decisions given limited knowledge of how 
cookies and cookies features impact their privacy.  
Based on this model, we label cookies that offer a high benefit/cost ratio and 
are from high trust websites as good; bad cookies are those with a low 
benefit/cost ratio and are from low trust websites. It is more difficult to label 
cookies in the other two quadrants. We term cookies that provide a high 
benefit/cost ratio but are from low trust websites as ‘high risk, high reward.’ We 
designate cookies that offer a low benefit/cost ratio but are from trusted websites 
as ‘future investments’; such cookies require that users trust the site to provide 
benefits in the future given that they are using cookies to collect personal 
information now. 
Evaluating User Decisions 
Using this model, we categorized two sets of website cookies: (1) the 85 websites 
whose cookies were blocked by at least one user; and (2) the 85 most popular 
websites whose cookies were not blocked by any users. We categorized the 

















Figure 6. Cookie label model. 
groups such as Privoxy, EPIC, and the Center for Democracy and Technology2. 
Table 1 summarizes these categorizations. 
                                                   Table 1. Website categorization data. 
The data is encouraging. Among websites whose cookies were blocked, most 
are categorized as bad and only a handful fall into other categories. In contrast, 
the distribution among websites whose cookies were allowed is broad. Together, 
good and bad cookies constitute nearly half of all allowed cookies, while future 
investments and high risk, high reward cookies comprise the other half.  
Recall that our goal is to evaluate whether Acumen helps users block bad 
cookies and allow good cookies. Taken together, this data suggests that it does. 
Acumen’s true positive and true negative rates are an encouraging 91% (29/32) 
and 87% (72/83), respectively. Acumen false positive rate is only 3%. An 
interesting result is Acumen’s 13% false negative rate; this rate is the number of 
bad cookies that are allowed by all users. There is no immediate explanation for 
this rate. It may reflect the fact that users acted conservatively, only blocking 
cookies they could confidently say were bad; alternatively, users may not always 
be able to recognize bad cookies. 
Finally, it is important to note that these results are in aggregate, and Acumen 
certainly served some users better than others. One prominent Internet privacy 
study has shown that there are at least nine major factors that influence Internet 
privacy management (Ackerman et al., 1999). Moreover, the study found that 
there are three principal classes of users: privacy fundamentalists, privacy 
pragmatists, and the marginally concerned; each class has demonstrably different 
privacy needs. Pragmatists, the largest group of users (55%), often make 
sophisticated privacy judgments that cannot be easily reduced to rules. 
We found anecdotal evidence that some users did in fact disagree with our 
model. One user blocked a “good” website’s cookies because she felt that there 
was no reason for the site to be using cookies. Another user experimented with 
blocking a “future investment” site’s cookies to evaluate how it affected the site’s 
performance; when she found that blocking cookies did not notably degrade the 
site’s performance, she permanent blocked its cookies. 
These anecdotes suggest that simply automating cookie management by 
implementing our model would be insufficient for some users. In particular, 
Acumen’s approach of helping users make informed decisions rather than 
automating decision making is likely especially useful for pragmatists. Further 
                                                           
2 http://www.cdt.org 
 Allowed cookies Blocked cookies 
Good 34% (29) 3%  (3) 
Bad 13% (11) 85% (72) 
Future investment 28% (24) 2% (2) 
High risk, reward 25% (21) 10% (8) 
studies are needed to evaluate how Acumen does and does not support particular 
types of individual cookie management practices. 
Challenges 
In this section, we discuss five challenges that we encountered while designing 
Acumen. The first challenge is universal for privacy management systems, and 
nearly all privacy management systems must address it. The latter four challenges 
are unique to our approach, and systems that employ social navigation to support 
privacy management must address them. 
Raising Awareness for an Unknown Problem 
Users will not use a privacy management system if they do not perceive a threat 
to their privacy. Users are largely unaware that cookies can be used to identify 
them and record their browsing activity, and many Internet cookie management 
tools go unused as a result (Turow, 2003). Making users aware of the 
pervasiveness of cookies and the risks that they pose is important if Acumen is to 
be used. 
Acumen raises awareness of cookies by “pushing” information about cookies 
to the user. Acumen’s interface is persistent; it displays all websites using cookies 
on a webpage and information that details how other users are managing cookies 
from these sites. Acumen attempts to draw users’ attention to sites that others 
have blocked cookies from; thus, Acumen attempts to highlight sites that other 
users have deemed a risk to their privacy. 
Our data indicates Acumen does raise users’ awareness of cookies. Many users 
commented that they were surprised and somewhat concerned about particular 
websites that were using cookies. One user was quite surprised when a cookie 
from the website ‘escapefromatlanta.com’ appeared on a webpage he was visiting 
for the first time. This cookie concerned him as it indicated that the website 
“knew” that he lived in Atlanta even though he had provided no data to the site; 
thus, another site had likely shared his data with escapefromatlanta.com After this 
incident, he became more proactive about managing his cookies. 
We were surprised to find that simply presenting social navigation data 
motivated some users to start managing their cookies. One user commented that 
since other users were managing their cookies, it was “probably something I 
should do as well.” It did not matter which cookies others were blocking; simply 
knowing that they were managing their cookies was motivation enough for this 
user. 
Users did take advantage of Acumen’s color coding to identify websites from 
which other users have blocked cookies. Users found Acumen’s color scheme 
useful and not overly distracting.  Some users wanted the ability to sort websites 
based on social navigation data so that sites from which many users have blocked 
cookies appear first in the toolbar; Acumen currently displays sites in roughly the 
order that their cookies are found on the page. 
Understanding Decision Support 
Understanding when and how Acumen supports individual cookie management is 
perhaps the most important evaluation criterion for Acumen. Using this criterion, 
we can ask three questions about Acumen: (1) Did users employ Acumen’s social 
navigation data? (2) If so, how did they employ it when making decisions cookie 
management decisions? (3) Did users employ Acumen’s rules to automate cookie 
management? 
Consider the two initial questions. In our deployment, users, on average, 
explicitly blocked cookies from ten websites and automatically blocked cookies 
from seven websites. It is not surprising to note that the ratio of cookies explicitly 
blocked to cookies blocked via rules is higher for mavens than for other users. 
Anecdotes obtained from interviews indicate that users employed Acumen’s 
data for different purposes when manually managing cookies. One user stated 
that, when blocking a website’s cookie, he felt like “it was a pat on the back” if 
others had blocked the site’s cookies as well. Thus, this user found a measure of 
validation for his decision by looking at others’ data. Another user said that when 
she considered making a decision that others disagreed with (e.g. blocking a site’s 
cookies that others had not), she thought more carefully about the decision than 
she otherwise would have. This user, then, used the data to help her decide which 
decisions to consider more carefully. There were also users who engaged in herd 
behavior and blocked a site’s cookies because others had. 
In addition to these purposes, we expect that there are many more purposes for 
which users may employ Acumen’s data, and more research is needed to identify 
and understand them. These anecdotes, taken together with our earlier analysis 
that indicates that users share some agreement of good and bad cookies, suggest 
that Acumen helped users during the process of decision making and helped them 
make effective decisions. 
There is evidence that users found Acumen’s rules for automating cookie 
management useful. Users created few new rules, yet all users knew about 
Acumen’s rules and understood how they worked. Acumen automatically created 
two rules when a user signed up for an account: (1) if 20% or more of all users 
have blocked cookies from a website, automatically block the site’s cookies; and 
(2) if 10% or more of mavens have blocked cookies from a website, automatically 
block its cookies. 
In our limited deployment, these rules were sufficient for all but the most 
advanced users. Due to the small number of total users in our deployment, 
though, there were only two mavens; the small number of mavens did not allow 
for the latter rule to be meaningful for users. In interviews, most users said that 
they appreciated the rules as a mechanism for blocking cookies. Users favored 
using rules to block cookies because they either didn’t know which cookies to 
block or were simply too preoccupied with other tasks to manage their cookies. 
 
Table 2. Acumen’s site traffic obeys 
power law. 
Table 3. Acumen’s attains substantial 
site coverage. 
Social Navigation Data and Coverage 
A system that employs social navigation data to support privacy management is 
most effective when it can provide data about many of the potential decisions a 
user may face. If the number of potential decisions is too large or many potential 
decisions are not explored by users (and thus there is no data for these decisions), 
the system’s data is unlikely to provide sufficient coverage over potential 
decisions and the system is rendered ineffective. 
We can evaluate Acumen’s data coverage in terms of websites. There are 
millions of websites, and Acumen will not contain social navigation data for 
every site. The question, then, is which websites will Acumen likely have data 
for? And will users notice or be significantly harmed by the data that Acumen is 
missing? For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that Acumen has social 
navigation data for a website if two or more uses have visited the site. Thus, any 
user who visits the site can observe how at least one other person manages the 
site’s cookies. 
We can posit answers to these questions by observing that Acumen’s data is 
tied to user’s browsing activities; users will manage only cookies that they 
encounter while browsing. Hence, Acumen’s data coverage mirrors the coverage 
obtained by users’ browsing activities. Traffic among websites on the Internet has 
been shown to obey a power law distribution (Huberman, 2001). A basic power 
law distribution for web traffic says that the Nth most popular website receives 
about 1/N as much traffic as the most popular website. It follows that traffic to the 
most popular sites is a very, very large proportion of total traffic. Acumen, then, 
should contain social navigation data for the most popular websites and be 
exponentially less likely to have data for less popular sites.  
Data from Acumen’s deployment confirms this hypothesis. The website traffic 
through Acumen’s proxy exhibits a power law distribution (Table 2); traffic to 
1.4% of websites accounts for 20% of all traffic, and traffic to 10.1% of sites 
accounts for 60% of all traffic. Overall, nearly one quarter of websites in Acumen 
have social navigation data. Among the 20% of websites with the most traffic, 
however, nearly half have social navigation data, and among the 60% of sites 
with the most traffic, one-third have data. Table 3 summarizes Acumen’s 
coverage data.  
This data provides a strong indication that website coverage can be attained for 
much of the Internet and for nearly all of the Internet’s popular sites. A related 










question is whether social navigation data is more useful for popular or obscure 
sites; we plan to explore this question in the future. 
Mitigating Herd Behavior 
One problem that social navigation systems sometimes experience is herd 
behavior (Banerjee, 1992). That is, users blindly follow the decisions or behavior 
of others because that data is available and assumed to be correct. This 
phenomenon could be especially problematic for Acumen because many users 
have little experience managing cookies. We attempted to address this problem in 
Acumen by identifying mavens and presenting social navigation data from them. 
We hypothesized that mavens’ data could offer a more informed–and thus more 
useful–set of information than could data from the general community. 
It was difficult to determine whether mavens’ data was useful to the users in 
our deployment. There were only two mavens during the deployment as the total 
number of users was small, and many websites did not have data from mavens. 
When sites did have mavens’ data, it was only somewhat useful to users. Some 
users were skeptical that mavens were more knowledgeable than other users and 
thus relied on social navigation data from all users rather than on mavens’ data.  
We speculate that mavens may need to provide credentials in order for users to 
trust that they are more knowledgeable than others. In addition, more work is 
needed to investigate how to effectively identify mavens. 
Addressing a Privacy Paradox 
A paradox arises when employing users’ data to support privacy management: it 
is possible to solve one privacy problem while creating another. By collecting and 
making users’ data visible, as Acumen does, it is possible that users’ privacy 
could be compromised.  
Recall that Acumen ensures users are anonymous at both the interface level 
and at the system level. Even with these precautions, many users were mindful 
that Acumen was recording their activities. Rather than just log out, users 
sometimes chose to both log out and stop using Acumen’s proxy so that they were 
confident Acumen was not recording their activities. It is unlikely that we can 
alleviate all users’ privacy concerns as long as Acumen employs a central 
database; one solution is to develop a distributed architecture in which users’ data 
is kept on their personal machine and shared anonymously.  
However, there is a tension between the users’ anonymity and the usefulness 
of social navigation data. Social navigation data becomes more useful as the level 
of anonymity decreases; knowing more about the data’s source enables users to 
better evaluate and employ the data. 
Future Work and Concluding Thoughts 
We expect to iterate on Acumen’s design and deploy Acumen for an extended 
period of time to an established community. We anticipate that a larger, extended 
study will enable us to address some of the questions posed in this paper about 
Acumen’s usage and about the challenges discussed above. In addition, deploying 
Acumen to different communities would enable us to begin to understand how 
community attributes (e.g. size, purpose, attitudes) affect usage of Acumen. 
We are interested in understanding and designing to support the large-scale 
dynamics that undergird Acumen. Identifying mavens is critical to the success of 
Acumen, and we plan to further explore methods to identify mavens. Mavens may 
be best identified by a combination of methods, such as through the 
recommendation of others, the demonstration of expertise by mavens, or via 
machine learning techniques (e.g. manually identify a few mavens and find others 
that are similar to these mavens). Understanding how privacy management norms 
develop in Acumen and the role that mavens play in the development process is 
also a rich area for future research. 
Using social navigation to address privacy management in domains beyond 
Internet cookies is promising. Cookies are only one area of Internet privacy; other 
areas include voluntary submission of personal information and adware/spyware. 
We are interested in developing systems that use social navigation to support 
privacy management in these areas. We also intend to explore applications of our 
approach to privacy management problems in ubiquitous computing systems.  
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